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  Entry and exit are fundamental underpinnings of the competitive process.  They 
ensure that a sufficient number of firms remain in an industry, and produce efficiently, in 
order to satisfy the market demand at a competitive price.  Moreover, entry and exit need 
not be in the form of firms actually appearing on, or departing from, the industry scene.  
They may well be in the form of an increase or a reduction in the volume of activities and 
the volume of resources engaged in the production process, or a change in the type of 
activity.  The competitive process results in the flow of resources into efficient units and 
out of inefficient ones - a process which may also be interpreted as  'entry' and 'exit'.  A 
contraction of demand for some products, for example, should lead to either the exit of 
resources from some of the production units, or the closure of some plants, in an industry.  
With modern large scale corporations the exit process is, most often, characterised by a 
reorganisation of resources- their withdrawal from some, and flow into other, activities.  
In this sense market economies can be characterissed by an almost permanent flow of 
resources out of old, inefficient activities and into new ones.  Only in a small number of 
cases, and generally rarely, is the exit of resources associated with financial distress, 
default on debt, insolvency and ultimately bankruptcy and the disappearance of the firm. 
  Modern firms are characterised by a web of formal and implicit contracts which 
integrate and articulate the interests of different parties with claims on a firm’s assets.  
The interested parties, or claimants, include the firm’s creditors with varying degrees of 
seniority: government, banks or creditors with secured collateral, employees, ordinary 
bondholders and unsecured creditors, customers, suppliers and, of course, managers and 
shareholders.  These formal and implicit contracts are part and parcel of the system of 
property rights in developed market economies.  Their operation is facilitated through the 
financial system and financial markets.  The financial institutions and markets provide 
information on the performance of various economic units and agents (search light 
effect), invoke appropriate reactions from the market participants, and impose certain 
disciplines on those units and agents. 
  When, in an economy with developed financial markets, firms get into financial 
difficulty, the distress will manifest itself in lower share prices, and will set in motion a 
number of possible mechanisms.  On the one hand, mergers and take-overs may be 
encouraged (or provoked) by the appearance of signs of financial distress and lower share 
prices.  This is particularly the case if other market participants consider the firm's 
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financial problems a temporary phenomenon caused by inefficient production or 
management systems or an inappropriate output bundle.  Through the take-over 
mechanism the ownership of the distressed firm (together with its liabilities) may pass on 
to new owners who can get the firm out of financial difficulty by producing the right 
bundle of goods more efficiently.  The take-over process effectively facilitates the exit of 
excess or inefficient capacity. 
  On the other hand, the distressed firm may embark on formal or informal 
negotiations with its creditors with a view to work out a programme of rehabilitation by 
rescheduling its debts and rearranging its financial status.  Such programmes usually 
involve restructuring of the firm including downsizing and the closure of loss-making 
operations.  Here, too, there will be some 'exit of resources' from the industry.  A third 
possibility facing the financially distressed firm, of course, is its liquidation- the physical 
exit of the firm from the market - which is embarked upon when all other venues are 
closed. 
  In fact, if the financial markets and the take-over mechanism performed 
efficiently, with all the relevant information available to all participants, the take-over 
mechanism would have eliminated the need for a separate 'bankruptcy procedure'.  The 
value of any firm, even those in financial difficulties and bankrupt ones, will be 
transparent to market participants and, given the right prices, any firm will find a buyer. 
As soon as financial distress sets in, one would expect a fall in the valuation of the firm 
and the appearance of some buyers on the scene.  But the absence of fully efficient 
financial markets, together with the existence of asymmetric information between the 
firms’ insiders (managers) and outsiders (claimants) require the existence of an additional 
mechanism of checks and balances to protect the interests of a firm's creditors.  These 
checks and balances are codified into ‘bankruptcy laws and procedures’ to supplement 
the existing property laws. 
  The process of exit, whatever form it takes, is set in motion by either the firm itself 
(usually the managers) or by its creditors.  The more common forms of exit - the flow of 
resources out of an activity taking place in downsizing and restructuring, mergers and 
takeovers - are generally planned and implemented by the management on behalf of the 
firm's owners.  But the more drastic forms of exit - entering the bankruptcy proceeding 
with the possibility of liquidation - are usually forced upon the firm by its creditors or by 
legal provisions aimed at protecting the interest of creditors. 
  The creditors of a financially distressed firm play the crucial role of monitoring its 
performance and imposing financial discipline (including the threat of bankruptcy) on it.  
In sharp contrast to the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe where 
"creditor passivity" has been identified as a major cause of the continuation of the 'soft-
budget constraint' regime, the creditors in a developed market economy have direct and 
strong incentrives to insist on the implementation of the appropriate legal provisions 
when faced with a defaulting debtor.  Here the creditors must respond to market signals 
relating to the debtor firm and act promptly (and aggresively) in the interest of their own The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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survival.  Any sign of 'passivity' will reflect badly on the credotrs and may quickly 
undermine their position via the financial markets.
2 
  This paper is concerned with the ultimate form of exit, i.e. bankruptcy, and will 
concentrate on the implications of the bankruptcy process for the behaviour of economic 
agents associated with a firm in financial distress (different creditors, managers, owners, 
etc). The importance of bankruptcy laws and procedures lies in the fact that they 
complement, and help the enforcement of, property rights.  They regulate the way each 
group of claimants is recompensed without undermining the claims of other groups.  In 
the absence of bankruptcy laws, any sign of financial distress may result in a creditors’ 
rush, like the run on a bank, as each creditor will try to seize a part of the firm’s assets 
and realise her/his claim.  Bankruptcy laws achieve the compensation of claimants in an 
orderly fashion and, as Baird (1991) observes, settle all creditors’ claims at once and in 
one place.
3 
  Furthermore, the bankruptcy laws  in all countries establish a system of priority to 
settle the claims of different claimants, or stakeholders.  Known as the ‘absolute priority 
rule’ (APR), the system generally starts with the government’s tax and social security 
claims, followed by unpaid wages of employees, the claims of secured (senior) creditors 
with a lien on physical assets, unsecured (junior) creditors or bondholders, trade creidtors 
and finally the firm’s shareholders (themselves divided into the holders of preference 
shares and ordinary shares).  The importance of APR lies in the principle that each 
category of claim, in the established order of priority, must be settled in full before the 
claims of the next class of creditors are attended to.  The shareholders, at the bottom of 
priority pyramid, will thus receive something only if all other creditors’ claims are met in 
full.  The APR embodies the existence of a system of property rights and reflects the 
operation of an established legal system.  The observance, or violation, of  APR is an 
important aspect of the implementation of bankruptcy laws and a major source of 
controversy amongst bankruptcy scholars.   
  The operation of bankruptcy laws and procedures is closely related to the nature 
and level of information available to stakeholders.  The managers of modern corporations 
are in the unique position of using resources owned by other people, "other people's 
money" as Miller called it,
4 on their behalf.  In this process, they also borrow money to 
supplement internal funds, and make investment and production decisions which 
influence the owners' net wealth.  With the management's superior knowledge of the 
firm’s true financial position, and the asymmetric information between them and 
creditors (existing and potential), there is always the likelihood of them embarking on 
imprudent investment decisions.  In particular, if their position is threatened by a 
potential bankruptcy, the probability of highly risky investments (made in desperation) 
will increase, and the value of the firm driven down.  The ‘limited liability’ form of 
                                              
2  For a discussion of causes and implications of creditor passivity, see Mitchell (1993). 
3  Baird (1991), p. 223. 
4  Miller (1977), p.40.  A more modern version of this concept is put forward in Akerloff (1993) notion of 
'bankruptcy for profit'. 
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organisation (in comparison with individual proprietorship and partnership forms) allows 
the managers to make such risky decisions and grants them personal immunity from the 
consequences of these decisions. Furthermore, and again because of incomplete 
information and uncertainty, the managers are able to hide the real position of the firm 
from its creditors for a considerable length of time.  The bankruptcy laws have, therefore, 
stipulated a number of mechanisms to ensure that all stakeholders are properly informed 
of the financial position of the firm.  These laws specify the conditions under which the 
procedure is 'triggered off' and the person or body with legal obligation to initiate the 
process.  The prevalence of incomplete information about the real position of the firm 
and the final division of the firm’s assets in the event of insolvency, makes the triggering-
off provisions all the more important.
5   
  Given the management's exclusive knowledge of the firm's position, most 
bankruptcy laws place the onus of declaration on them.  Even though the management, to 
a greater or lesser extent, may be considered responsible for the plight of the company, 
nonetheless, they are the best persons to initiate the process.
6  They are the first to 
become aware of the firm's financial distress and the interest of creditors will be better 
protected if they are under legal obligation to set the bankruptcy process in motion.  The 
existence of over 1000 cases of company director disqualifications for failing in their 
legal obligations to declare insolvency under the 1986 U.K. Insolvency Act, lends 
support to the view that managers should be responsible for triggering off the bankruptcy 
procedures.
7  This is in fact the way the bankruptcy procedures operate in the four market 
economies studied here- the management is legally responsible to file for bankruptcy, 
within a short period of 2 to 3 weeks, in the event of insolvency or default on debt.  In 
most countries, the creditors (or a specified group of them) are also entitled to trigger off 
the procedure if the information available to them (or collected by them) points in the 
direction of default and insolvency. 
  The bankruptcy procedure is usually triggered off when a firm defaults on its debt.  
But the procedure does not necessarily lead to the exit of the firm, or even the exit of 
some production capacity.  Liquidation (or exit in strict sense of the term) is only one 
option facing the management.  In this case, the bankruptcy procedures specify the 
manner in which the firm in the liquidation process is either sold as a going concern or its 
assets are disposed of piece by piece, in order to repay the claimants in accordance with 
the APR.  If a firm is to be liquidated, the observance of the APR means that shareholders 
and managers will often receive little or nothing as the value of firm’s assets may fall 
short of the claims against them.   
  Alternatively, the bankruptcy procedures may allow the management to choose 
the option of 'reorganisation'.  Reorganisation or restructuring is aimed at finding a 
                                              
5  For a discussion of the importance of incomplete information and its implications for the cost of bankruptcy, see 
Webb (1987).  Webb maintains that, under perfect information, sharehoders and bondholders could avoid costly 
bankruptcy. 
6  Baird has reminded us of the 18th Centrury English law under which non-cooperating debtors in bankruptcy cases 
were hanged whereas cooperating debtors received 5% of the value of recovered assets! See Baird (1991), p. 225. 
7  Franks & Torous (1992), p. 75. 
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method of rescuing the firm from financial distress and salvaging all or parts of it for the 
benefit of all claimants.  Typically, it involves a process of negotiation between debtors 
and creditors with a view to establishing a new mechanism for the settlement of claims 
which may be different from the APR: writing off some of the claims, injection of new 
capital, swapping new equities for old ones, exchanging bonds and other debts with new 
notes, bonds or cash, etc.  In short, it amounts to a re-writing of the debt contracts of 
different groups of claimants and creditors.  Any bargaining aimed at rewriting the debt 
contracts will impart the debtors a bargaining power from which they may benefit at the 
expense of creditors.  As such this will amount to a violation of the APR and, to many 
observers, it may undermine the basis of normal business practice and property rights, 
thus adversely affecting rational economic calculations.  The insiders will have a strong 
incentive to prefer this option to liquidation and the strict observance of APR.  But in 
addition to the insiders' self-interested motives, there are often other considerations which 
encourage the firms to opt for the reorganisation option - the chance to reduce the loss 
accrued to creditors, protection of jobs, retention of productive capacity and receiving 
government subsidies.  Moreover, the availability of reorganisation as an option means 
that the management will be less likely to take high risk investment decisions under 
financial distress of the typ to which we referred earlier.  The important caveat about the 
procedural choice is that the bankruptcy law must be able to produce, and administer, an 
efficient rate of bankruptcy- i.e., it should prevent premature or delayed bankruptcies.  In 
other words, the bankruptcy procedures should enable firms to survive only when their 
continuation value exceeds their liquidation value. 
  The legal provisions for reorganisation vs liquidation vay significantly in different 
market economies with different impacts on the incentives of different agents and their 
behavioural pattern.  Although the debtor firms may have a strong incentive to opt for a 
formal, court-based reorganisation in order to try to resolve their financial difficulties and 
regain their health
8, the legal provisions may not always be conducive to such preference. 
  The purpose of this paper is to analyse the economic implications of the 
bankruptcy procedures in Western market economies with a view to draw appropriate 
lessons for the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  In Section II, we 
shall discuss the bankruptcy procedures in four major market eocnomies, emphasising the 
conditions under which the financially distressed firms are reorganised or liquidated.   
Section III focuses on the relative efficacy of the 'reorganisation' option in comparison 
with the 'liquidation' option of the bankruptcy procedures.  Section IV highlights the 
lessons that East European transitional economies may learn from the experience of 
market economies, drawing attention to a number of important areas of concern in any 
discussion of the design and implementation of bankruptcy procedures. 
 
 
                                              
8  It is also possible to engage in a privately negotiated restructuring, avoiding the lengthier court-based procedures.  
More on this later. 
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II. Bankruptcy Procedures in Different Market Economies 
  In this Sction we shall briefly discuss the bankruptcy procedures in four market 
economies: United States, United Kingdom, Germany and France. The emphasis 
throughout this Section will be on the relative position and powers of creditors and 
debtors, and on the impact of bankruptcy procedures on the incentives of different 
economic agents. 
  a. United States. The emphasis of the bankruptcy procedures in the United States 
(and also France as we shall see shortly) is on the survival of the firm and the saving of 
employees’ jobs and the firms’ productive capacities - thus the notion of 'debtor-oriented’ 
procedures.
9  This is achieved by providing the firm with a breathing space to enable it, 
free from the pressure of claimants, to negotiate with its creditors with a view to 
restructuring its debts and finding a way out of distress .  The U.S. Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 allows the management of the firm to file for bankruptcy either under the 
Act’s Chapter 7 (the liquidation option) or under its Chapter 11 (the reorganisation 
option).  If the latter course of action is chosen, the managers will receive temporary 
court protection from their creditors and will be given time to prepare a reorganisation 
plan which has to be put to claimants for approval.  During this period, referred to as 
‘debtor-in-possession’, the management will remain in charge of the firm, protected by 
automatic stay of claims against the company.  It would also be able to raise new finances 
on preferential terms (i.e., as high priority claims).  Moreover, the firms in reorganisation 
will benefit from a number of explicit and implicit subsidies (mostly from the 
government).
10  The management has 120 days to prepare a reorganisation plan (a period 
which may be-and often is- extended by the Court) and a further two months to gain the 
approval of its creditors.
11  Ultimately, the plan must be approved by the majority 
(representing 2/3 of claims) of creditors in each class of claimants.
12  The law groups 
claimants into different classes according to the nature of their claims: secured creditors 
are treated as one class, unsecured bondholders another, small claimants another, 
shareholders another, and so on.  The plan may (and often does) include restrictions on 
management and conditions, such as a threshold debt-asset ratio or market valuation, 
aimed at protecting the creditors from unjustified risky behaviour by the management.   
                                              
9  For detailed discussion of the American bankruptcy code, see White (1984), Franks & Torous (1989) and White 
(1989). 
10  These include: the carry forward of tax losses in previous years, debt forgiveness, termination of under-funded 
pensions and their subsidisation by the State, non-payment of interest on credits during the period of preparing a 
reorganisation plan, and the possibility of abandoning unprofitable contracts without a penalty.  These subsidies, as 
Whilte has pointed out,  largely accrue to creditors and not the equity holders -as the legislators may have intended.  
See White (1984), pp. 37.24-37.26. 
11  Although the debtor has extensive rights during the reorganisation period, these are not at the expense of  
creditors whose interests are also protected by the code.  They usually set  up a creditors’ committee; they have 
‘rights of discovery’; and, occasionally, the court may appoint a trustee to supervise the work of management. 
12  This is often referred to as the ‘unanimous consent procedure’ (UCP).  If the plan is not approved by all classes 
of creditors, an alternative procedure, called ‘cram-down’, may be embarked on.  Under ‘cram-down’, a modified 
version of  the reorganisation plan is approved by the Court and provisions are made for the ‘fair and equitable’ 
treatment of the dissenting classes of creditors under the Court’s supervision. The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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  The reorganisation option of the American bankruptcy code has proved to be 
extremely popular with the stakeholders (debt-holders and equity-holders) of firms in 
financial distress.  The number of filings for court protection increased by six-fold 
between 1979 and 1989 - from 3042 in 1979 to 17447 in 1989.  Some observers attribute 
this massive increase to the enhanced protection of debtors and the opportunity to 
protract the control of existing managers over the firm's assets (without any serious cost 
to them).
13  It is alleged that managers and shareholders may try to ‘protract’ their control 
of the firm without bearing any (or little) of the costs.  After all, if the firm fails in its 
attempt to regain its health, the expenses of the reorganisation period and plan fall on the 
creditors, with the managers/shareholders being no worse off than before. 
  The American bankruptcy procedure also allows for ‘privately arranged’ 
reorganisations (or ‘work-outs’) as another option for firms in financial distress and their 
creditors.  This type of reorganisation is, of course, speedier and less costly than that 
under Chapter 11 and, therefore, offers the potential that all claimants may gain from it.  
But it lacks the court protection, the temporary stay of claims, tax advantage and the 
relatively cheaper credit offered through the formal reorganisation procedure. Gilson, 
et.al. (1990) studied the characteristics of 169 firms listed on the N.Y. or American Stock 
Exchanges which experienced financial distress between 1978 and 1987.  Altogether 80 
of these firms succeeded in reaching an agreement with their creditors and to privately 
restructure their debts.  They concluded that this method is more likely to succeed if (i) 
the distressed firm has more intangible assets (i.e. if there is a greater difference between 
the going-concern value of assets and their piecemeal values which may be lost in a 
lengthy procedure or in liquidation); (ii) it owes more to banks and financial institutions 
than to other businesses; and (iii) there are fewer creditors to deal with.  When the 
number of creditors is large, the chance of reaching an agreement, which has to be 
unanimous, recedes.
14 
  b. United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom (and also Germany), on the other 
hand, the emphasis of the bankruptcy procedure is on the protection of creditors’ interest 
- the so-called ‘creditor-oriented’ procedures.  The most important feature of this 
orientation is the fact that the management loses its unquestioned right to manage the 
firm’s assets during the procedures.  The 1986 Insolvency Act
15 offers the management 
and creditors of an insolvent firm several options: liquidation, receivership or 
administration - all of which involve the appointment of an insolvency practitioner to 
protect the interests of creditors.  Under the ‘liquidation’ option, the firm, or any of the 
creditors, applies to the Commercial Court for the appointment of a liquidator whose sole 
task is to sell the assets of the firm in order to meet the claims of creditors according to 
                                              
13  See Bradley & Rosenzweig (1992), p.1090. 
14  Under Chapter 11 provisions, it is also possible to have a ‘pre-packaged’ procedure combining private 
restructuring and Chapter 11 court protection.  Here, a privately negotiated restructuring plan is filed with the Court 
at the same time as the bankruptcy application under Chapter 11. See Gilson, et.al. (1990), pp. 324-325. 
15  For a detailed discussion of UK bankruptcy procedures, see Otter (1988), Wooldridge (1987) and Franks and 
Torous (1992).  In the British legal terminology ‘bankruptcy’ applies to individuals and ‘insolvency’ to companies.  
Here, we ignore this distinction in the interest of simplicity and consistency with the procedures in other countries. 
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the APR.  The ‘receivership’ option, which is available only if there are secured 
creditors
16, is more complicated.  Any secured creditor with a fixed charge may appoint 
its own receiver who will take control of the charge (the asset used as security for that 
particular creditor).  Here the receiver represents the interests of the ‘appointor’ (the 
single creditor who appointed her/him).  Alternatively, a secured creditor with a ‘floating 
charge’ may appoint an ‘administrative receiver’ to take control of all assets (except 
those with fixed charges) and be responsible to all creditors, albeit in some order of 
priority.  Either type of receiver will have to decide on whether the firm should be 
retained as a going concern or be wound down. A receiver cannot dispose of the asset 
over which she has been appointed if it affects the normal operation of the company 
unless a decision is made to liquidate the company. 
  The receivers' preferences and behaviour are influenced by the prevalent incentive 
mechanisms.  Most often, the receivers prefer to liquidate the company in order to meet 
the claims of their 'appointors'.  Their lack of  full knowledge of the firm’s potential and, 
more importantly, because any of the other creditors can apply for the appointment of a 
liquidator at any time, encourages the tendency towards liquidation.  (A receiver and a 
liquidator may be appointed at the same time.)  Furthermore, a receiver faces a potential 
conflict between the interests of the individual appointor and those of other creditors.  
The law has placed various restrictions on the receivers in order to ensure that they will 
try to obtain the maximum possible proceeds from the disposal of assets and other 
activities.
17 These restrictions also strengthen the receivers’ preference for liquidation. 
  The 1986 Act offered the management and creditors of companies in financial 
difficulty a new option: administration. Here, the Companies Court appoints an 
‘administrator’, with precedence over both the ‘liquidator’ and the ‘receiver’, to take 
charge of the company.  The administrator has three months to prepare a plan for 
reorganisation which has to be approved by more than 50% of creditors.  The court, too, 
can impose the plan on the creditors.  With the administrator appointed, there is a stay of 
claims against the company while a reorganisation plan is being prepared. 
  One important distinguishing feature of the UK procedures is the fact that the 
reorganisation plan is prepared by the administrator and not by the management (as in the 
U.S.), whose powers are greatly reduced during the administration period.  Another 
distinctive feature of the U.K. procedures is that secured creditors, with a fixed or 
floating charge, are able to block the appointment of the administrator by appointing their 
own receiver or liquidator.  In other words, the administrator can only be appointed if the 
majority of creditors are convinced that it may serve a purpose.  It was initially thought 
                                              
16  Under British Law, there are two types of secured creditors: those with fixed charges and those with floating 
charges.  A fixed charge is a fixed asset, usually an immovable object, which is used as a security for a loan.  Any 
alteration to the use of the fixed charge by the company must be with the approval of the creditor.  A floating charge 
is an unspecified asset used as security with the creditor while the company retains its freedom to change the use of 
the said asset.  If the company gets into financial difficulty, specified by certain criteria, a floating charge will 
become a fixed charge and the creditor may appoint a representative (the receiver) to take control of it. 
17  The ‘receiver’ is personally liable for events after her/his appointment.  Other creditors, for example, may file 
law suits against the receiver if they feel that their interests have been damaged by the activities of the receiver - 
thus the tendency to opt for liquidation as the safest option.  See Franks & Torous (1992), p.73 for an example of 
this type of law suit. The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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that the 'administration' option would usher in a procedure similar to the Chapter 11 
provisions of the U.S. bankruptcy code.  But, as Webb has pointed out, the limitations 
placed on the management and the emphasis on creditors' rights meant that the 1986  Act 
“stopped a long way short of giving the U.K. the equivalent of Chapter 11”.
18  The 
creditor orientation of the British law has meant that there was no repeat of the American 
experience of an explosion in the number of filings following the adoption of the new 
Act. The "few hundred" cases involving the appointment of 'administrators' compares 
very poorly with "several thousands" of cases involving the appointment of receivers.
19   
  Finally, as in the U.S., the 1986 Act allows for the possibility of semi-formal, 
privately arranged reorganisations, known as ‘workouts’ or ‘schemes of arrangement’.  
The Court must, of course, approve such arrangements which are agreed between the 
company and creditors. 
 c.  Germany.  The German insolvency procedures have always been 'creditor-
oriented'.  Until recently, they were explicitly aimed at complementing the competitive 
process of natural selection by facilitating the elimination of weaker firms.  In the last 
two decades, however, it has been recognised that the survival of enterprises in financial 
difficulty may be beneficial in an economy with high unemployment.  Nevertheless, 
despite this recognition and also the appointment of a Commission for the reform of the 
insolvency law in 1978, the legal framework has remained largely unchanged.
20   
  In Germany, a company in default may follow any of the two separate legal 
provisions: the Bankruptcy Act (for the purpose of liquidation) or the Judicial 
Composition Proceeding (for the purpose of reorganisation).
21  The firm or the unsecured 
creditors can initiate the bankruptcy procedures by petitioning the Bankruptcy Court.  It 
is of course imcumbent upon the management of the debtor firm to file a petition with the 
Court within three weeks of ascertaining that the firm is insolvet.  The company's control 
and management is then transferred to a court-appointed 'trustee' with the explicit 
objective of liquidating the company and realising the value of its assets in order to meet 
the creditors' claims in the order of APR.  The secured creditors may also petition for 
bankruptcy even though they generally operate outside the bankruptcy procedures and 
use the security in their charge to recoup their claim.  In Germany, as a defensive 
mechanism against bankruptcies, most loans to companies are secured in order to enable 
creditors to recoup their loan independent of bankruptcy laws. 
  A particular feature of the German law is that the majority of bankruptcy 
proceedings, up to 76% according to Fialski's estimate, are not completed due to 'lack of 
                                              
18  Webb (1991), p. 156. 
19  Franks & Torous (1992), p.75. 
20  For a detailed discussion of the German bankruptcy laws, see Fialski (1994); and Klasmeyer & Kubler (1994). 
21  These two acts are Konkursordnung (usually referred to as KO) and Vergleichsordnung (usually referred to as 
VerglO).  The territories of former GDR (five Lander and East Berlin) are subject to different insolvency 
procedures known as the 'General Enforcement Act' (Gesamtvollstreckungsordnug- or GesO), passed in 1990 as 
transitional measures.  For more details see Klasmeyer & Kubler (1994), pp. 17-133 to 17-146. 
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resources' to meet the procedural costs and claimants' demands.
22  The Court, too, may 
dismiss the petition for bankruptcy on the grounds that procedural costs can not be 
covered.
23   If the bankruptcy petition is dismissed for insufficient funds, the joint stock 
company will be dissolved in accordance with Section 1.7.1.1 KO. 
  The debtor firm may, alternatively, petition the Court under the Composition 
Proceedings (which dates back to 1935) and propose a composition plan.  The 
composition plan must be approved by a simple majority of creditors, representing 75% 
of all claims.
24  Under composition proceedings, the management remains in charge of 
the company even though they are subject to the 'monitoring' and 'examining' roles of the 
court-appointed 'trustee'.  As in the bankruptcy case, the composition petition may be 
dismissed if the available resources are insufficient to meet the procedural costs.  Once a 
composition plan is confirmed by the Court, no application for bankruptcy will be 
entertained. 
  The legal framework for composition, however, is highly restrictive.  First of all, 
unlike the American procedures, there is no stay of claims against secured creditors who 
can still liquidate their security to recoup their claims against the firm.
25  Secondly, the 
firm must be able to offer all creditors 35% of their claims in cash as a minimum 
condition for a composition.  As a result of these restrictions, the Composition 
procedures play a minor role in Germany- only one percent of insolvencies are resolved 
through this option.
26  If the composition plan does not receive sufficient support , the 
liquidation procedure will come into force.
27    
  It is also possible, as in the U.S. and U.K., to arrange ‘out-of-court compositions’ 
which are not subject to strict rules of normal compositions.  In fact, given the difficulties 
of the composition procedure, a large number of insolvencies (according to some 
estimates as high as 20-30%) opt for out-of-court arrangements.
28 
  In recent years, there has been much discussion concerning the reforming the 
German insolvency procedures.  The Commission for Insolvency Law, appointed in 
1978, has produced draft proposals which aim at unifying the three insolvency 
procedures (KO, VerglO and GesO of the former GDR territories) into one law and at 
bringing the spirit of the German law somewhat closer to the American Chapter 11 
provisions- thus encouraging more reorganisations.  The proposals, which are due to take 
effect in 1977will, of course, not resolve the problems caused by the German practice of 
pledging nearly all assets to creditors.  They will, however, remove the ability of secured 
                                              
22  Klasmeyer & Kubler (1994), p.17-8; and Fialski (1994), p. 23.. 
23  However, if the creditors are willing to pay the procedural costs, in advance, the bankruptcy petition will be 
heard.  
24  Under some conditions this may be raised to 80%.  See Klasmayer & Kubler (1994), p. 17-126. 
25   The Court may, of course, prevent such asset disposals. 
26  Klasmayer & Kubler (1994), p. 17-7; and Fialski (1994), p. 27.. 
27  Section 7.4 of the VerglO. 
28  Klasmayer & Kubler (1994), p. 17-9. The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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creditors to dispose the secured assets during the bankruptcy or composition proceedings, 
and also enable the creditors to put forward composition plans.
29 
 d.  France.
30  The present French Bankruptcy procedures is based on Laws passed 
in 1984 and 1985 and amendments of June 1994.
31  Before the recent amendments, the 
law was strongly aimed at facilitating the rescue of financially distressed firms through 
reorganisation.  The social and political motives behind the law were transparent: under 
conditions of high unemployment, jobs should be saved if at all possible.  The 1984 and 
1985 Laws replaced the previous procedures which emphasised the speeding up of asset 
disposal and the satisfaction of creditors' demands.  The 1994 amendments, however, 
were adopted in order to strengthen creditors' rights and enhance the efficiency of the 
judicial restructuring process.   
  Under specidal procedures adopted since 1982, firms suffering from financial 
difficulties may obtain advice and support from counselling organisation, at national, 
regional and departmental levels.  The 1984 Law also envisaged the appointment of a 
Conciliator by the Commercial Court who will assist the firm in raising new loans and 
negotiate with all or some of the creditors and suppliers in order to resolve the firm's 
financial problems.  In practice, until recently, the conciliation procedures were not 
widely used as they depended on the mutual agreement of debtors and creditors.  But 
under severe economic conditions affecting the property sector in the early nineties, they 
were successfully employed by the Paris Commercial Court to avert large scale 
bankruptcy of property firms.  Apart from the official conciliation procedure, the Courts 
have also appointed, on ad hoc basis, 'guardians' to advise financially distressed firms 
before the enter the bankruptcy proceedings.
32   
  The bankruptcy procedure in France is set in motion by the application from the 
firm, the creditors, the public prosecutor's office, or the Court officials.  The management 
is legally responsible to file a bankruptcy petition with the Commercial Court
33 within 15 
days of default on payment (cessation des paiements).  The Courts may impose a range 
of legal sanctions against non-compliant managers but, on the whole, the threat of 
sanctions is not very strong. Consequently, bankruptcies initiated by the management are 
                                              
29  For a discussion of the proposed bankruptcy procedures, see Fialski (1994) and The Economist, May 21, 1994. 
30  I am grateful to Sophie Bourguignon who provided me with information on the recent changes in French 
bankruptcy laws. 
31 For details of the French bankruptcy laws and procedures, see Simeon, et.al. (1987); Chartier (1989); Mitchell 
(1990b); Derrida, et.al. (1991); and Lafont (1994).  For the 1994 amendments (Law no. 94-475 of 10 June 1994), 
see Campana and Legeais (1994) and Journal Officiel, 11 June 1994.  Mitchell's study includes a useful appendix 
comparing the bankruptcy laws of different countries (even though the discussion of  UK Insolvency Act of 1986, 
and particularly the nature of different types of ‘receivers’ is rather confused).  Mitchell's paper also includes a brief 
description of the Japanese bankruptcy code which resembles, in many important respects, the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code. 
32  Lafont (1994), pp. 18-19. 
33  In the case of agricultural organisations or private non-commercial legal entities, the petition is filed with the 
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exceptional.
34  Bankruptcy proceedings are often initiated by the firm's creditor(s) who 
only need to prove the firm's 'default on payment'.   
  The 1985 Law stipulated that the Court, upon the verification of the ground for 
bankruptcy, will initiate a 'decree on judicial restructuring' (redressment judiciaire).  The 
decree involves an 'observation phase' (periode d' observation) and the appointment of a 
Receiver (administrateur judiciaire).  During the observation phase, the Receiver (whose 
powers are determined by the Court) will assess thefirm's economic and social conditions 
and the possibility of its rehabilitation.  The Receiver, after the completion of his 
assessment and negotiation with interested parties, may recommend rehabilitation, in 
which case she/he will prepare a 'continuation plan'.  The purpose of this plan is to create 
the necessary conditions for the restructuring of the firm (which may involve downsizing 
its operations or changing the management structure if necessary), to renegotiate its debts 
and undertake to pay some or all of the creditors within a specified time period.   
Alternatively, the Receiver may decide that the firm has little chance of survival and 
should be liquidated, in which case a 'disposal plan' will be prepared.  This would involve 
finding a third party taking control of some or all of the firm's assets (but not its 
liabilities) for an agreed price.  
  The Receiver has six months to prepare a plan for the Court, a period which may 
be extended by six months normally (and a third six months in exceptional 
circumstances).  Although there has been much discussion regarding the long duration of 
the observation phase and the 1994 amendments were expected to shorten this period, no 
significant changes were made by this review.  Both 'continuation plan' and 'disposal 
plan' must be approved by the Court. During the observation phase, all proceedings 
initiated by the creditors against the firm will be suspended and so will any payment of 
pre-existing debts.  Claims born during the observation phase and the implementation of 
the consequent plans will be priority claims.
35   
  Finally, if the Receiver cannot complete a 'continuation' or a 'disposal' plan, the 
Court will issue a judgment of  'judicial liquidation' and appoint a liquidator (usually the 
representative of the creditors) to complete the process of asset sale, at highest obtainable 
price, and to distribute the proceeds amongst creditors.  
  The procedures outlined above, in particular the compulsory observation phase, 
have a strong orientation towards the debtor firm and likely to weaken the the 
disciplinary nature of bankruptcy. The 1994 amendments removed the compulsory nature 
of the observation phase, leaving it to the discretion of the Court which may now decide 
to initiate a 'judicial liquidation' without going through the ovservation phase.
36  The 
change will, to some extent, strengthen the position of creditors and speed up the 
liquidation of firms with little chance of a successful continuation or disposal plan.   
                                              
34  Chartier (1989), p. 174.  
35  The priority of pre-bankruptcy secured creditors was somewhat unclear until the 1994 amendments which gave 
these claims priority over claims born after the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings.  See Campana and Legeais 
(1994). 
36  Even under the 1985 Law, the judges had the discretion of reducing the compulsory observation phase to a 
symbolic minimum, pronouncing the liquidation of a manifestly unviable firm on the same day as the decree on 
judicial restructuring.  See Derrida and Sortais (1994), p. 274. The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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  Unlike the U.S. code which requires the approval of the reorganisation plan by a 
specified proportion of all classes of creditors, the French code empowers the courts to 
approve or reject the plan prepared by the Receiver without requiring the creditors’ 
majority approval.  Of course the Receiver is required by the Court to 'consult' the firm's 
management, employees representatives, creditors and other interested bodies and ask for 
their views on the continuation (or disposal) plan.  But the ultimate decision is made by 
the Court without requiring the approval of creditors.  This aspect of the proceedings 
survived the 1994 amendments intact and is still a feature of the French bankruptcy laws. 
III. Is Reorganisation Efficient? 
  The evaluation of the relative effectiveness of reorganisation versus liquidation is 
crucial for any appraisal of the efficiency of the bankruptcy procedures in a market 
economy.  Whether or not the 'reorganisation' option is superior to the 'liquidation' option 
would depend on two important factors:  (i) what are the costs of reorganisation and who 
will bear it? and (ii) would a reorganisation result in the distortion of market signals and 
the legal basis of rational economic calculations?  Most of the research in this area is 
based on the American experience, where the reorganisation procedure offers greatest 
protection to the firm and greatest degree of autonomy and independence to its managers.  
This literature on reorganisation concentrates on a number of important issues such as 
managerial behaviour, the lengthy and costly bargaining and litigation process and the 
implications of the violation of APR.  
Most of the contributors to the debate have argued that the incentive mechanism 
associated with bankruptcy procedure encourages high risk strategy and opportunistic 
behaviour by the managers.  Precisely because they remain in power during the 
reorganisation, it is emphasised, the managers will have a tendency to embark on riskier 
investment decisions - a tendency strengthened by the fact that they do not bear the 
ultimate costs of their decisions.  Stiglitz (1972) showed that, with the possibility of 
bankruptcy allowed, the firm will suffer from the effects of the conflict of interest 
between equity holders and bondholders, with the managers tending  towards greater 
risky borrowing.
37  Later on Meckling (1977), Miller (1977), Moore (1977) and Bradley 
& Rosenzweig (1992) all argued that the protection offered by the Chapter 11 procedures 
results in higher borrowing and greater risk-taking by the debtor firm.  Moreover, both 
Moore and Meckling argued that the cost of borrowing will also increase because the 
creditors have to be more careful in their lending policy, assess loan applications more 
thoroughly and monitor the progress of their borrowers more frequently.  They will pass 
the additional costs of  processing, observation and monitoring to borrowers.
38  Bradley 
and Rosenzweig go a step further and argue that managers’ willingness to borrow money 
and take on additional debt has increased by the advent of Chapter 11-type protection.  
They studied the average debt-asset ratio of firms filing for bankruptcy before and after 
                                              
37  Stiglitz (1972), pp. 461 and 480.  Stiglitz maintained that while bondholders are concerned with the affairs of the 
firm in all states, the equity holders are concerned about returns on their investment  only in those states when the 
firm does not go towards bankruptcy. 
38  More recently Scott & Smith (1986) have argued that the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act has, for similar reasons, 
resulted in increased cost of borrowing for small businesses. Iraj Hashi 
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the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and showed that the average debt asset ratio of firms 
under consideration increased after 1978.
39 
  If a firm is insolvent and is wound down, the shareholders (and managers) may 
receive very little or nothing upon liquidation.  But if they embark on reorganisation, 
there is some chance of the shareholders receiving something as a result of their 
increased bargaining position. However, even if they fail to turn the firm around and 
return it to health, they may not be much worse off than before.  Thus Miller (1977) has 
compared the reorganisation option a 'call option': the shareholders call on the option (to 
share in whatever benefits the reorganisation creates) if their plans succeed, but will not 
call on the option if their plans fail.  Costs of reorganisation, of course, are borne not by 
the shareholders but by the creditors. 
      It is of course right to assume that managers have a personal interest in 
prolonging their reign and retaining the firm’s control for as long as possible and that 
they would use the Chapter 11 provision for this purpose if they have to.  Many 
alternative theories of the firm support this view.  But this need not be the only reason for 
embarking on this course of action and the role of personal interest should not seen in 
isolation.  Managers (and their shareholders) also stand to lose in bankruptcy, not only 
their jobs and the associated benefits but also their reputation - a point ignored by the 
proponents of the 'call options' analogy.  There is, in any market economy, a managerial 
labour market in which managers' performance are evaluated and which imposes a 
discipline on managers.  Using a sample of 111 firms (61 filing for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 and 50 private restructuring), Gilson (1989) and (1990) has clearly shown 
that the majority (over 60%) of  the chief executive officers and members of board of 
directors of firms involved in either bankruptcy or private restructuring lose their jobs 
after the end of the proceedings.  What is even more serious is that their chances of being 
appointed to other directorships also declines.  This observation severely undermines the 
argument that managers have nothing to lose in a bankruptcy. 
  The reorganisation procedure is obviously lengthy and costly, factors which 
should be taken into consideration when evaluating the relative efficiency of this option.  
The estimates for the time spent in reorganisation vary in different studies: 1.4 years for a 
sample of  26 firms completing reorganisation between 1980 and 1982 in White (1984); 
2.8 years for a sample of 26 firms completing the reorganisation process between 1970 
and 1986 in Franks & Torous (1989); 2.1 years for a sample of 30 firms successfully 
reorganising between 1979 and 1986 in Eberhart et.al. (1990); and 2.4 years for a sample 
of 30 firms which went through successful reorganisation between 1979 and 1986 in 
Weiss (1990).
40  It must, however, be remembered that the lengthy process is not 
primarily because of the bargaining between creditors and debtors.  The possibility of 
                                              
39  Bradley & Rosenzweig (1992), p.1095. 
40 Weiss’ sample actually contained 37 companies but only 30 of them completed the reorganisation process 
successfully.  The time spent in reorganisation is calculated for the these 30 firms.  Similarly, Franks & Torous’s 
sample contained 30 firms, included four railway companies whose reorganisation was extraordinarliy lengthy 
because of the complications of the regulatory framework to which railways are subject.  These firms are exculded 
from the calculations for the purpose of comparability with other studies.  Their inclusion would have increased the 
average period in reorganisation to 3.67 years. The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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future legal claims against the company arising from such events as exposure to toxic 
waste material or unsafe pharmaceutical products account for many lengthy litigations.
41 
  Similarly the estimates of direct costs of reorganisation (lawyers, trustees, 
administrators and various consultants’ fees) vary widely in different studies.
42  
Measured as a proportion of the market value of the firm in the year prior to bankruptcy 
filing, the direct cost  was estimated at 4.6% in Altman’s study of 18 firms filing between 
1972-78 (before the new Bankruptcy Code) and  2.8% in Weiss’ study of 37 firms filing 
between 1979 and 1986.
43  On the other hand, measured as a proportion of the liquidation 
value of the firm (which is obviously lower than the market value a year before the 
bankruptcy filing), the estimates range from 3.4% in White's (1984) study of 64 firms to 
7.5% in Ang, Chua and McConnell’s (1982) study of  86 firms.
44  Specific industry 
studies seem to come up with bankruptcy costs slightly higher than mixed samples: 
9.12% of the value of firms in Guffey & Moore (1991) study of 16 firms in trucking 
industry which filed for bankruptcy between 1971 and 1985; and 10% of the value of 
assets in James (1991) study of 412 bank failures between 1985-88.  It is also generally 
accepted that the direct costs of reorganisation as a proportion of the amount received by 
creditors, is less in reorganisation than in straight liquidation.
45  
  The survival of firms in reorganisation is also an important issue which should be 
addressed briefly.  While, as Warren (1991) points out, the data on the overall success 
rate is "virtually non-existent"
46, some observers incorrectly assert that, in general, the 
bulk of firms in reorganisation end up in liquidation.
47  These observers disregard the 
widely varying survival rates for firms of different size and different activity.  The 
available  empirical evidence paint a more optimistic outcome for this procedure, 
suggesting that the success rate is much higher for larger firms.  LoPucki's study of all 
Chapter 11 cases (57 firms altogether) filed with the Bankruptcy Court of the Western 
Missouri District during the first year of the operation of the new Bankruptcy Code 
showed a success rate of 26% for all firms and 86% for large firms in the manufacturing 
                                              
41  See Eastbrook (1990), p.416 for a discussion of this issue. 
42  As for the indirect costs (opportunity costs) of bankruptcy, i.e., lost sales and profit, tarnished image, loss of 
reputation, loss of skilled employees, etc., despite few rough attempts such as Altman (1984), no serious progress 
has been made.  Altman estimated the indirect costs, for a sample of 18 firms filing for bankruptcy between 1972 
and 1978 to be about 10%.  See Ibid., p. 1077. 
43  Altman (1984), calculated from Tables  I and II, pp. 1074-1075; and Weiss (1990), p.290. 
44  White (1984), p. 37.45; and Ang, Chua and McConnell (1982), p.223.  The latter study, it should be pointed out 
concentrated on firms filing for bankruptcy between 1963 and 1978, i.e. before the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act 
came into effect.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of comparison with other studies, their estimate of direct bankruptcy 
cost is useful. 
45  See White (1984), Tables 37.4 and 37.5.pp.146-147. 
46  Warren (1991), p. 15. 
47  For example, see The Economist, August 1 1992 which in an article entitled "When Firms Go Bust",  put the 
success rate of firms in reorganisation at 20%.  Similarly, in an  OECD report, Swain maintained that the success 
rate was between 10% and 27% - the basis of calculations in neither of the two studies is clear. 
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sector.
48  White (1984) study of a sample of 64 companies, filing for reorganisation 
between 1980 and 1982, found that at least 40% of them succeeded in ultimately 
adopting a reorganisation plan approved by all classes of  creditors.  On the other hand, 
Morse and Shaw’s study of 162 firms in the 1973-82 period showed a success rate of at 
least 60% and Gilson, et.al.’s study of 89 firms filing under Chapter 11 between 1978 
and 1987 showed that 95% of them succeeded in reorganisation.
49 
  In France too, concern has been raised about the success of reorganisation 
procedures.  The overall rate of success (i.e., the percentage of firms adopting a 
continuation plan during the observation phase) is estimated to be about 7-8% and has 
remained relatively stable since the adoption of the 1985 Law.
50  For the Paris district, 
according to the information provided by the Commercial Court of Paris, the percentage 
of firms adopting a continuation plan was 13% in 1993 and 17% in 1994.  The 
information is, however, not detailed enough to identify the success rate for larger firms 
and compare them with the American experience. 
  The last aspect of the reorganisation discussed in the literature deals with the 
implications of the violation of priority rules.  The reorganisation or restructuring plan 
negotiated between managers and creditors reflects the bargaining power bestowed on 
the debtors by law, manifested in alterations to the original terms of contract (possibly in 
favour of equity holders and sometimes junior claimants).  This is tantamount to violating 
the established property rights system (enshrined in the APR) in favour of the debtors.  
The alterations to the original terms of the contract, or the violation of the APR, has been 
the focus of much of the economists’ contribution to this debate.  Most of the research, 
however, is based on individual case studies and small sample investigations.  Studies by 
Franks & Torous (1989), Eberhart, et. al. (1990), Weiss (1990), and Eberhart & Sweeney 
(1992), showing that the absolute priority rule is violated in majority of cases, are all 
based on samples between 27 and 37 firms filing for bankruptcy.  There is, however, less 
consensus on the magnitude and the method of  measurement of costs of this violation or 
the particular class(s) of creditors which are most affected by it.  The amount received by 
shareholders, in excess of what they would have received under APR, varies between 2.4 
and 7.6% according to different studies.
51 
   To a large extent, the arguments outlined above fall short of a comprehensive 
assessment of the relative costs and benefits of reorganisation.  The critics of the 
reorganisation option (its American or the continental versions) seem to have emphasised 
the ‘potential’ negative impact of this option on efficient operation of the legal process 
                                              
48  LoPucki (1983), pp. 100, 108-109.  These results were confirmed when nearly a declade later LoPucki and 
Whitford studied 77 "megabankruptcies" (firms with assets in excess of $100m which filed under Chapter 11 
between 1979 and 1988) and found that their success rate was between 89% and 96%.  For details see LoPucki and 
White (1991), p.41, f.n. 105. 
49  White (1984), pp. 37.40-37.41; Morse and Shaw (1988), p. 1198; and Gilson, et.al. (1990), p. 321. 
50 See Credot (1994), p.12; Derrida & Sortais (1994), p.268; and Saint-Alary-Houin (1994), p. 107. 
51 See Eberhart, et.al (1990), p. 1464; and Eberhart & Sweeney (1992), p. 944.  In a typical reorganisation, share 
holders often receive new securities and creditors receive varying types of securities, cash, bonds or notes.  These 
figures have to be treated with caution as they are based on inaccurate -or inappropriate- methods of valuation of the 
new assets.  The complications of comparing the new securities with the old ones and other problems of  measuring 
the extent of deviation are discussed in Franks & Torous (1989), pp. 754-758 and Weiss (1990), pp. 292-293. The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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without considering its ‘potential’ benefits.  To begin with the issue of management 
behaviour under limited liability conditions, we have already pointed out the weakness of 
the argument that managers have little to lose in a reorganisation or bankruptcy.   
Moreover, it is sometimes ignored that the limited liability form of organisation (which is 
blamed for the risk taking tendency of managers) is one of the most dynamic and 
efficient organisational innovations of the last century.  The existence of outside finance, 
and firms and individuals who provide the financing, has been a major element 
guaranteeing the efficient operation of joint stock companies.  Bond-holders and other 
creditors (especially institutional creditors) have made the managers less insular and 
more responsive to market signals.  They engage in collection and analysis of 
information and impose a market discipline on the managers.  In their absence, firms will 
be almost closed to outside scrutiny and the shareholders in danger of being manipulated 
by the managers.  As Gilson (1990) and Wruck (1990) have demonstrated, when 
financial distress sets in, non-equity claimants take an active interest in corporate 
governance and put pressure on managers to find a solution - a pressure that might not 
materialise from equity holders.
52  
  Secondly, in all reorganisation procedures, the creditors do have the choice of 
rejecting the reorganisation plan.  The reason they accept this procedure is that they, like 
managers, believe it is possible to reverse the firm's financial difficulty.  And if the 
course of action taken by the managers succeeds, the creditors will be the main 
beneficiaries.  It should also be remembered, as many bankruptcy cases show, that the 
creditors can (and often do) impose certain conditions on the firm and its managers which 
prevents them from excessively risky or opportunistic behaviour. Reorganisation plans 
have, for example, stipulated threshold debt-asset ratio above which managers cannot 
borrow on secured terms, threshold market capitalisation levels below which certain 
corrective mechanisms will automatically come into force, maximum allowable 
administrative expenses, restrictions on asset disposals and investments, etc.
53   
  Thirdly, on the crucial issue of the violation of the APR, there is no reason to 
believe that unequal treatment of different claimants (which often arise in reorganisation 
plans), small as it is, creates significant market distortions.  In a bankruptcy, creditors will 
lose out to varying degrees depending on how secure their claims are.   The amount of 
loss, which is part and parcel of business risk, will vary from case to case depending on 
the value of claims and the value of assets (either their liquidation value or their going-
concern value).  We have already pointed out that there is no systematic, large scale study 
of the magnitude of the costs of reorganisation and those who suffer most.
54  T h e  
essential point is to note that if some of the claimants wish to form coalitions with other 
                                              
52    Wruck even argues that it is more efficient to be highly leveraged because the creditors will have a stronger 
incentive to monitor the managers and press them for restructuring in the face of financial distress. Wruck (1990), p. 
433. 
53  See Gilson (1990), p. 367 for more examples of restrictions imposed by creditors on the management.   
Furthermore, it has been observed by some bankruptcy scholars that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was largely what 
the creditors had wished for and met their needs.  See Eastbrook (1990), p. 413. 
54  Some studies such as Franks & Torous (1989), pp. 755-757 and Weiss (1990), pp. 294-296 identify the junior 
creditors as the main losers.  Others such as Eberhart and Sweeney (1992) maintain that bondholders (a subset of 
junior creditors) benefit from APR violation -albeit only by a little - at the expense of senior creditors. Iraj Hashi 
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stakeholders which may be more beneficial to some and less to others, they are legally 
entitled to do so.  After all, the senior claimants may appreciate the value of managers’ 
knowledge of the firm and their ability to preserve the firm’s value, and be prepared to 
strike a deal with them which offers the shareholders something in excess of that 
warranted by the strict application of the APR.  As Baird & Jackson (1988) have pointed 
out, the ‘recontracting’ associated with the reorganisation plan is at the discretion of 
senior claimants who may “convey an interest in (the assets of the firm) to anyone (they) 
please.”
55  The gains by equity holders is "because the senior creditor has concluded that 
doing so is in its interest..".
56  There is nothing intrinsically inefficient about this 
recontracting process. 
  Finally, in any assessment of reorganisation, the wider social costs and benefits of 
bankruptcy has to be taken into account.  A reorganisation which prevents premature 
liquidation will lead to the preservation of jobs and productive capacities that may 
otherwise disappear forever.
57  What is crucial for the economy is that firms with a 
chance of survival should not go bankrupt prematurely.  The optimum rate of bankruptcy 
is one that involves least cost to the society as a whole, and results in the preservation of 
firms over a longer time period than that dictated by short term financial considerations. 
  Reorganisation is aimed at raising the value of a firm in financial difficulty above 
its liquidation value and may potentially benefit most of those concerned.  The fact that a 
large number of firms embarked on reorganisation succeed is an indication of the social 
efficiency of this process.  Therefore, we may say that firms opt for reorganisation not 
solely (or even primarily) for opportunistic reasons but also because: (i) they believe they 
are in temporary financial difficulty and a short respite will allow them to return to 
health; (ii) their liquidation value is (or may be) less than their value as a going concern; 
and (iii)  the post-reorganisation situation may be more beneficial to most of the 
stakeholders.   
IV. Bankruptcy Procedures and Transitional Economies  
  What lessons can the East European transitional economies draw from the 
bankruptcy procedures of developed market economies?  What are the options facing 
these reforming economies and how can the experience of other countries help them 
choose the appropriate option?  In the past five years most East European economies 
(certainly the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) have adopted new bankruptcy laws 
and procedures, or revived their old ones.  These are examined elsewhere in detail.  Our 
discussion in Sections II and III highlights a number of important areas which are of 
particular relevance to transitional economies.  In the remainder of this Section we shall 
discuss these areas briefly. 
a. Causes of Financial Distress 
                                              
55  Baird & Jackson (1988), pp.742-743. 
56  Ibid., p. 743. 
57  Hudson (1990), pp. 210-211. 
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  While in Western market economies the firm and its management are generally 
considered responsible for financial distress, the position in Eastern Europe is more 
complex.  The type of bankruptcy procedure (reorganisation or liquidation) the firm 
should embark on depends on why the firm has got into financial difficulty.  Here, the 
reason for the insolvency of a large number of firms is not that they are either inefficient 
or that they produce the wrong bundle of goods.
58
  External shocks and government 
policies during the early stages of transition, too, may result in financial distress.  The 
restrictive macroeconomic policy, liberalisation of foreign trade and the collapse of 
CMEA markets all resulted in financial difficulties for a large number of firms for which 
they cannot be held responsible.  The necessary adjustments, in production method, 
resource deployment, choice of output bundle or marketing, were not easy for many of 
these firms and could not be achieved with sufficient speed.  The uncertainty about future 
ownership and the method of ownership transformation combined with the inability to 
raise sufficient funds for new investment compounded the problem.  Many firms would 
have been able to sort out their problems if they could raise funds on financial markets 
and alter their production technology and product mix and find new markets. 
  In market economies, the number of firms in financial distress is relatively small 
with the number of those going bankrupt even smaller. In transitional economies, 
however, the number of financially distressed firms is very large, constituting the 
majority of large  and medium size firms in many of these economies.
59  The liquidation 
or exit of these firms is not a minor issue, a by-product of the competitive process and 
natural selection.  Given the magnitudes involved, a potentially explosive situation may 
be created if such firms were allowed, or forced, to go into liquidation.  At stake is a 
massive productive capacity which may be lost forever as a result of these firms' exit.  
Moreover, the financing of unemployment benefit to the redundant work force and the 
maintenance of the social safety net will put additional pressure on the State budget with 
adverse implications for macroeconomic policy.  Neither implications are socially 
desirable and may not be tolerated by the citizens of these emerging democracies. 
  The socially undesirable implications of large scale liquidation means that 
'reorganisation' should be seriously considered, and strongly encouraged, as an 
alternatives to liquidation.
60  Naturally, reorganisation would involve lengthy 
negotiations between the enterprise, government agencies, banks and other creditors.   
Most observers in this area have proposed reorganisation procedures involving debt-
equity swaps combined with appropriate incentives for enterprises and banks (such as 
writing off the interest on senior debts of enterprises, bank recapitalisation, rescheduling 
                                              
58  For a detail discussion of financial distress and indebtedness, see Begg & Portes (1993); Ickes & Ryterman 
(1993); and Kornai (1993). 
59  It is possible to provide the numerical magnitude of debt for over 1700 Czech and 500 Polish enterprises, if 
necessary.  For the extent and magnitude of indebtedness in Hungarian enterprises, see Mizsei (1993), pp.50-54 and 
Kornai (1993). 
60  The support for reorganisation procedures has been expressed by many scholars including, among others, Abel & 
Gatsios (1993); Gray (1993); and Mizsei (1993). 
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of other debts, etc.).
61  The bank-led restructuring legislation in Poland (which came to an 
end in April 1994) was a major attempt at encouraging reorganisation and will be 
discussed elsewhere.  Given the incentive mechanisms applied, reorganisation may also 
create conditions for rent seeking and opportunistic behaviour by some of the agents 
involved.   
b. The Design of Bankruptcy Laws   
  Efficient bankruptcy laws should, in principle, result in the exit of those firms 
whose resources could be deployed more effectively elsewhere.  To this end, they should 
prevent the managers (or creditors) applying for reorganisation and prolonging the 
process when the firm has little chance of survival.  But, at the same time, they should 
also prevent premature liquidation - i.e., the disappearance of those firms which can be 
successfully reorganised.   
  The encouragement and support for reorganisation, of course, should not detract 
policy makers from the formulation of effective bankruptcy legislation dealing with both 
liquidation and reorganisation.  The "design" of the law is particularly important in 
transitional economies because of the impact of incentives (or disincentives) that it 
creates for the debtors and creditors.  It also has major implications for the effectiveness 
of the overall exit process.
62  The following are some of the major issues that have to be 
taken into account in the "design" of effective bankruptcy laws. 
(i) Declaration.  The process of transition has created a fertile ground for opportunistic 
and self-interested behaviour by enterprise managers which must be taken seriously by 
policy makers and legislators.  The managers of firms in financial distress wish to 
prolong their tenure by enlisting the support of government agencies (such as their 
founding bodies), banks and suppliers, and by lobbying the government for financial 
assistance.  In some cases (e.g. in Poland) they have dealt with their financial difficulties 
by simply allowing their debt to the State (taxes and social security arrears) or banks to 
rise.  In other cases, e.g. in the Czech Republic, they have allowed their debt to other 
enterprises to increase.  Inter-enterprise debt (or secondary indebtedness) has become a 
common problem in all transitional economies. 
  Bankruptcy procedures may involve effective mechanisms to prevent this situation 
and to impose a discipline on such managers.  The legal obligation to declare default on 
debt payment is the first step in this process.  It can be backed up by other sanctions 
against the managers of insolvent or defaulting firms, ranging from financial penalties 
and dismissals to the appointment of a 'trustee' or 'liquidator' empowered to annul 
previous suspicious transactions.  The Hungarian experience, whereby some 3500 cases 
of bankruptcy were filed in April 1992 alone (when the new bankruptcy law came into 
effect), shows the potency of the 'obligation to declare' provision.
63
  
                                              
61  For a discussion of several reorganisation options, see  Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) and Wijnbergen (1994). 
62  For a detailed discussion of the importance of the "design" of bankruptcy procedures, see Gray (1994), pp.13-18. 
63   The situation in the Czech Republic and Poland is very different though.  In the Czech Republic, the bankruptcy 
laws do not require the managers to file for bankruptcy on default thus creating incentives for opportunistic 
behaviour without any penalties.  In Poland, despite the legal requirement, many managers have failed to declare 
their conditions and, so far, none have been prosecuted. The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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(ii) Protection of interests of all creditors.  Reorganisation or liquidation should be 
overseen by outside specialists (judges, liquidators, trustees) in order to ensure that all 
creditors' interests are protected.   An essential element of the design of the law is the 
obligation to provide information on the firm's financial position, through reliable means, 
to all creditors.  A related issue is the choice of the proportion of creditors needed for the 
conclusion of a reorganisation agreement.  In some countries, such as Hungary, 
reorganisation was possible only with the unanimous agreement of all creditors.
64  In 
others, such as Poland, the support of 50% is sufficient for reorganisations.  While in the 
Hungarian case reorganisations were very difficult (thus the need to lower the threshold), 
in the Polish case the interest of minority creditors will be violated.  The creation of 
separate classes of creditors (as in the American legal provisions) combined with the 
majority approval seems to be a sensible compromise.    Such a provision will prevent the 
debtors reaching private agreements with some creditors at the expense of others.  They 
will also ensure that reorganisations involving accommodation between enterprises and 
banks (such as the 'bank conciliation process' in Poland) are not carried out without the 
support of the majority of creditors. 
(iii) The role of managers during reorganisation.  An important question which should 
be addressed by the bankruptcy law is: who should be in charge of the company once 
bankruptcy proceedings have been embarked upon.  As already mentioned, the 
bankruptcy procedures in many countries leave the existing managers in charge, 
particularly during reorganisation, because of their superior knowledge of the firm and its 
potential.  Given the shortage of alternative management personnel, bankruptcy 
practitioners and other experts in transitional economies, this seems to be a desirable 
model for them too.   But, in order to prevent managers from taking advantage of their 
position as 'debtors in charge', the procedure should impose a time limit on the managers 
to prepare a reorganisation plan with the proviso that after the expiry of this time the 
creditors should be able to propose their plan.  Furthermore, provisions may be made for 
automatic conversion of reorganisation to liquidation should the debtor and creditors fail 
to reach an agreement within a given time period.  These mechanisms, together, may 
produce the right incentive package for managers and encourage them to reach an 
agreement with creditors speedily.   
(iv) Absolute priority rule.  The establishment of a system of priority rules is essential 
for the efficient operation of the bankruptcy process.  Of equal importance are the 
establishment, or strengthening, of a system of secured credits and the setting up of a 
national register of assets used as collateral in order to prevent fraudulent use of the same 
asset as collateral against several loans.
65  These would allow banks and other creditors to 
provide secured loans to firms at reduced costs (due to lower risks).  They would also 
enable the firms in distress to borrow new funds during the reorganisation process since 
these loans will have priority over pre-bankruptcy loans. 
  A peculiar feature of many financially distressed firms in Central and Eastern 
Europe is the phenomenon that the State is, at the same time, the most senior claimant 
                                              
64  This was later changed to 50% (by number) and 67% (by value) of creditors. 
65  See the case study of Cottex Hrunov in Hashi, Mladek and Sinclair (1995) for a specific example of multiple 
collateralisation.  For a more general comment see the Economist April 16, 1994. Iraj Hashi 
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(with tax and social security arrears) as well as the most junior stakeholder (being the 
ultimate owner or part-owner of the enterprise).  Moreover, as the owner (or part-owner) 
of commercial banks, it is also amongst junior creditors along with other creditors.  This 
unique position occupied by the government creates weaknesses as well as opportunities 
for resolving the firms' financial problems.  The main weakness is that it accommodates 
creditor passivity (see below) and slows down the hardening of budget constraints.  There 
is potential for implicit understanding being reached by bank and enterprise managers to 
roll over past credits and lobby for (and await) government support. 
  On the positive side, the redistribution resulting from any violation of the APR 
will not be very severe - the State may lose in one capacity but will gain in another.  With 
government acting in several capacities, the number of claimants involved in any 
negotiation will be relatively small and the chance of reaching a settlement will be 
higher.  In fact the opportunity for private restructuring, which is quicker and less costly, 
will be enhanced.  The legal provision for bank-led enterprise restructuring in Poland 
shows that a large number of enterprises may survive without much loss to the State 
budget or creditors as a whole. 
(v) Incentives for liquidators and trustees.  Once the liquidation of the company (either 
as a going concern or piecemeal sale of assets) becomes inevitable, the remuneration of 
the liquidator or the trustee (as the case may be in different countries) becomes an 
important issue.  On the one hand the appointee should have an incentive to complete the 
process as quickly as possible.  On the other hand, she should try to realise the maximum 
possible value for creditors.  The incentive package, therefore, should include a fixed 
sum augmented by a proportion of the recovered value of the firm.  In the Czech 
Republic, for example, very few lawyers are prepared to accept trusteeships because they 
are very poorly remunerated.  But, at the same time, the liquidators are paid very 
generously, to the extent that their incentive to complete the case quickly is weakened.  
Furthermore, in order to prevent fraudulent disposal of the assets, the appointees should 
be held liable for their actions.  The threat of legal action by creditors who have suffered 
losses will impose some discipline on the liquidator or trustee. 
c. Creditor Passivity 
  The existence of bankruptcy laws will not, in themselves, ensure their application.  
Laws can only be applied if creditors have an incentive to pursue the debtors and demand 
their claims.  Creditor passivity, as Mitchell (1993) has shown, is one of the main 
obstacles to a faster restructuring of enterprises on the one hand and the relatively small 
number of bankruptcies on the other.   The passivity of banks, which are the main 
creditors of most financially distressed enterprises, is of particular importance here and 
should be highlighted.  In many cases, banks prefer to wait and retain some chance of 
recovering their claims (or parts of them) rather than push the debtor into bankruptcy and 
receive nothing or very little.  In some cases, they expect that at some time in future the 
value of debtors' assets will rise and some of the debts will be honoured.  More 
importantly, the loans are part of the 'assets' side of the banks' balance sheet and their 
writing off will reduce the value of the bank - which is not in the interest of banks' 
managers.  In some transitional economies, the banks expect that, in the end, enterprise 
debts will be written off by the government and the banks will be recapitalised, thus the 
incentive to wait rather than embark on the bankruptcy process.  Case studies of The Economics of Bankrupcy, Reorganisation and Liquidation 
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financially distressed enterprises confirm the reluctance of banks to embark on lengthy 
bankruptcy proceedings.
66   
  The main reason for the passivity of banks in transitional economies is the fact 
that they are, and for the foreseeable future will remain, state-owned banks.
67  New 
private banks, with the ability to compete with state-owned banks, will not appear on the 
scene in the near future.  The privatisation of banks will proceed very slowly and the 
State will retain large share holdings for a long time. The incentive to impose financial 
discipline on the debtors will remain at best weak until the emergence of competitive and 
independent private banks.  Consequently, it is up to the State to use its moral position 
and voting power to enforce some discipline on bank managers, making them responsible 
for their lending policy.  Any reorganisation, encouraged by the State, must take into 
account the incentive structure of not just the enterprise managers but also the bank 
managers.  They too should be subject to strict performance criteria with the threat of 
financial penalties and loss of employment for poor performance combined with rewards 
for good performance. 
d. Mergers.   
  In addition to reorganisation, a financially distressed firm may be encouraged to 
merge with a healthy company in the same industry.  Again, the East European 
governments are in the unique position of being able to influence (if not exercise direct 
control over) the decision making process in many firms.  In such cases, the implications 
of mergers for the competitive process would have to be weighed against the 
consequences of bankruptcy and liquidation.  As Miller (1977) and Peele and Wilson 
(1989) have shown, mergers may provide an efficient and viable alternative to 
liquidation, provided the anti-monopoly rules are relaxed, or interpreted more favourably, 
in order to preserve all or most of the distressed firm.  
                                              
66  See case studies of Cottex Hrunov and Zelenina Terezin in Hashi, Mladek and Sinclair (1995). 
67  For a discussion of the interaction between the banking system and the bankruptcy process, see Wijnbergen 
(1994). 
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